It came from far away, the jet black bird that landed and subsequently died in Parque Andino Juncal, near an altitude of 3,000 meters or around 9,000 feet.
This little bird was different than the other birds in Juncal.
It was streamlined, not colorful, round or compact like the birds that nibbled on bugs and seeds and crumbs of passing hikers or the torrent ducks who made their life in the whitewater of the rushing Juncal River, or the small flocks of green parakeets that fluttered, chattering, along the dusty dirt ledges that led down into that river.
According to an ornithologist who later examined it, the bird was a sea-going species that had become disoriented, maybe in a storm, or in a stream of high-altitude, fast-moving air that had deposited it, exhausted and starving, near a dusty rock in the Central Andes Mountains. It later died.
I hadn’t thought much more of it. My connections to Juncal had waned over the years as a reporter in the industrial and human-centered environment of Newark, New Jersey. And my emotional connections to the 30,000 acre private conservation initiative had become stale as my physical relationship to it had become a thing of my past life in Chile.
And then I quit my job, and I got on a the Amistad tall ship and ended up deep on the Atlantic Ocean, going through and beyond the locations vaguely present in the popular understanding of the sea, Georges Bank, the Hudson Canyon, the Bermuda Triangle, the Gulf Stream.
At night the air became fragrant and fecund, blowing gently across our cheeks as we ambled along towards Bermuda and then Puerto Rico.
It smelled like Juncal. There at the refuge called Los Hornitos, the place where the dusty road ends and visitors spend their first nights, some in a tent, or in the open air, or inside one of the two stone and mud structures, the smell becomes rich like the earth.
More often than not, in the morning, a dry wind blows hard from the border with Argentina and the glaciers along the border rushing into the Aconcagua Valley. In the afternoon the direction is reversed.
In the evening the air is quiet. And then, if one stays up particularly late, or wakes up during a dream, gets outside their tent or wherever they are sleeping, they will find that a humid, rich and temperate air has settled there.
Often late night air needs to braced against. This air is inviting and warm. This air was just like in the north Atlantic Ocean in August.
Maybe it was this air this bird was brought to.
The mystery of who killed famed Communist singer-songwriter Victor Jara seems to be almost resolved, or at least says the compiled judicial testimonies released in Chilean court today and an elaborate recounting of his last minutes by Jacmel Cuevas, writing for Ciper Chile, an investigative journalism site. For the first time a group of officers surrounding his death has been identified. Also, the details of Jara’s last minutes are detailed as is the story of how his body was found dumped outside a cemetery, spirited away and anonymously buried by loved ones.
It places into doubt previous testimony blaming the death of Jara on Edward Dimter Bianchi.
On September 17th, after four days of imprisonment and multiple sessions of torture in a basement room in Estadio Chile, with a swollen face and fingers fractured by the butt of a rifle, Jara was shot by a low-ranking officer on a round of Russian roulette, with the barrel of the revolver resting against the temple. Jara’s body fell to the floor on its side, convulsing, said José Alfonso Paredes Márquez, an 18-year-old military conscript on guard duty who witnessed the above events and testified to Judge Juan Eduardo Fuentes recently.
Jara’s body was then shot again 43 times by the conscripts there, including by the person who is making this testimony. There were 44 bullet wounds in his body, according to the autopsy.
The ranking officer, Nelson Edgardo Haase Mazzei sat behind an interrogation desk and observed. This is according to the singular testimony of Paredes Marquez, who began his obligatory military service in five months earlier.
Paredes Marquez is currently 55-years-old, lives in the Central Coast region of Chile, and works building houses.
Haase, in testimony, denied that he was present in the Estadio Chile. Testimony of officers and soldiers, compiled by the judicial case and the investigation by CIPER, contradict Haase and place him in Estadio Chile during the time of Jara’s death. The name of the man who first pulled the trigger is not in the Ciper account.
Yesterday, Paredes Marquez was arrested by the Chilean judge. Last year, César Manríquez Bravo, the commander of the Estadio Chile prisoner complex, was arrested for being the responsible officer at the time.
On April 23, 2007, Haase, who owns a company that makes wooden crates for shipping wine, participated in a charity golf tournament in a team made up of other retired military officials. They are pictured below.
In a telephone interview with La Nación newspaper Haase declares that he doesn’t like soccer and has never stepped foot in Estadio Chile (now re-named Estadio Victor Jara.) Haase said he was in an undisclosed location in the south of Chile at the time.
En una conversación telefónica con La Nación, Haase desmiente siquiera haber pisado el Estadio Chile.
-Algunos conscriptos lo mencionan a usted como quien dio la orden de asesinar a Víctor Jara en el Estadio Chile.
-Yo nunca estuve en el Estadio Chile y no conozco a ese caballero (Víctor Jara).
-Pero usted sí fue oficial del Ejército.
- Sí, estuve en el Ejército.
-¿Y estuvo en Tejas Verdes?
-Yo he estado en muchas partes.
-¿Y en el Estadio Chile?
-Yo nunca he estado ahí. No lo conozco. Ni siquiera me gusta el fútbol.
-No me refiero al estadio como recinto deportivo, sino de prisioneros.
-Nunca estuve ahí.
-¿Por qué cree que estos conscriptos lo señalan a usted?
-No tengo idea de lo que me habla.
-¿Dónde estaba usted el 15 de septiembre de 1973?
-En el sur.
-¿En qué parte del sur?
-Eso a usted no le importa.
-Seguramente será citado a declarar
-Mire, no sé por qué estoy hablando esto con usted, pero responderé a quien corresponda si es una llamada oficial.
Yesterday, La Nación asked Paredes Marquez a question in the hallways of the Chilean courts, did Haase give the orders. Paredes Marquez nodded his head.
“Si estando en el pelotón que ultimó a Víctor Jara, Nelson Haase Mazzei era quien daba las órdenes, José Paredes Márquez, albañil y obrero de la construcción, asintió con su cabeza afirmativamente.
Haase continued his military career as a confidant of Manuel Contreras, head of the DINA, and was the commanding officer of the clandestine detention center of the “Cuartel Bilbao,” according to CIPER.
Names of officers and soldiers mentioned in article
comandante (r) César Manríquez Bravo
Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda
Marcelo Moren Brito
capitán David González Toro
capitán Germán Montero Valenzuela
conscripto José Alfonso Paredes Márquez
Nelson Edgardo Haase Mazzei
Rodrigo Rodríguez Fuschloger
teniente Pedro Barrientos
conscripto Francisco Quiroz Quiroz
Mountain climbing and rescue tactics on Aconcagua.
Federico Campanini, also known by his nickname “Fede” was an internationally certified mountain guide who died after two days caught in a furious storm near the summit of Aconcagua, one of seven tallest peaks in the world at 22,841 feet. At age 31 he was alive and as of January 8th, 2009, he is dead. After a botched rescue, documented on a video released to Argentine media last Friday, he died of hypothermia, dehydration and an edema.
A 38-year-old Italian woman, Elena Senin, also died. She was part of a five-person group being led by Campanini to the top of Aconcagua, where it began to snow heavily minutes after beginning their descent. Participants, according to a youtube video, include Mirco Affasio and Mateo Refrigerato.
Annually, two-to-three people die yearly on Aconcagua, but this year has been extracted a steep toll. Five people have died so far this year, according to an article by the Associated Press. Six hundred people had signed up to climb the mountain.
Accounts state that the group faced winds up to 70 kph, temperatures of -25 Celsius and driving snow all the while mixing their own urine with snow to rehydrate themselves after two days of being trapped.
The video detailing his death was released by his father this past Friday in Argentina. It was given to him by an anonymous individual and subsequently released to local Argentinian media outlets.
It has ignited public commentary, a lawsuit and a Facebook group filled with public indignation over perceived ineptitude in rescue tactics.
In the United States Campanini worked for the Rainier Mountaineering, Inc. as a guide which has since set up a memorial fund in his name. From Mendoza, Argentina, the largest town to Aconcagua, he was an UIAGM guide who had moved to Utah in 2006 to
According to an online posting by fmiranda on the Chilean mountaineering listerv Tricuspide, it happened like this, and I paraphrase the translation:
“It appears that they went up the Gran Canaleta, to arrive to the North Peak, but at 4:30, a POOR time to summit a peak, and were caught by a storm. They returned, and made a mistake, coming down towards the Glaciar los Polacos. At that point a pair of Italians slipped, and one died on site, all of which was communicated by radio. They were still caught in the elements, without chances of escape and appropriate equipment for a couple of nights, during which temperatures dropped to -20 Celsius.”
According to an account in The Deseret News, of Utah, Campanini descended into the crevasse where the Italian woman fell and was stuck under a large piece of ice. It was there when his respiratory problems began.
The video shows the rescue group pulling Campanini up a slope. Apparently this is because they had found him down near the Polacos, and by that route would not have been able to have taken him further. They were trying to climb 400 meters to get the other, secure, route.
One begins to think of the intensity of mountaineering in these situations, in which each decision has to do with the preservation of life, cost and benefit, a risk calculus like one has never done before. Each step, or significant advance, is to proceed to another level or degree of exposure in which the calculus changes, and once again one has to re-evaluate the opportunity for life and the risk of death.
And one wonders, does at some point, a survival and individualistic instinct kick in, and make some members of the group want to go down by themselves, escape the group, clearly lame and left to die?
What were the rescuers thinking, exhausted, at almost 7000 meters, and apparently unprepared for this adventure where even there lives are put in danger by the rescue?
According to listserv discussion the poor conditions prevented other rescue groups from going up to the mountain. The rescuers were those guides or porters near that stage of the mountain and did not appear to have been in the position of preparedness for a rescue.
But a personal testimony might be best. “Rockney” was the guide for the last group to have seen them before the accident. My translation.
“Unfortunately, I knew the group of seven which attempted the summit that day, they left at 6:30 am on Monday the 6th of January, from the Berlin Refugio, at 5900 meters. The day was windy like none other, and according to the forecast, Sunday was the strongest day of a storm that on Monday would subside. I was with some Polish clients and we decided to attempt the summit when the intensity of the wind subsided. We left at 8 am, my group was fast and at first we saw no problem in leaving a little bit late and not facing the strong wind that was earlier. It also gave me a sense of security to know that I was not alone in the path above.
Around 6300 meters we passed one of the guides with an Italian girl who was going much slower than the rest. Neither of them passed the Independence Refugio at 6400 meters and descended.
We got to the rest of the group in the windy pass named “the finger” y and “the cave” (at the beginning of the small ravine and protected from the wind) and began to walk when they had arrived, reaching the summit around 4 pm and we began to come down when the Italian group hadn’t fully arrived. The Argentine guide came to me and said if you want, we can descend together…and in an immediate decision I said no. I had already been a half-hour on the summit and I couldn’t wait any more, and to mix my group with another, apparently slower group, would have put us in danger. (I must say that in the two times that I came to speak with the other guide his attitude was quite indifferent. At one point I offered my help with a client of his who was going faster (as they do in Volcan Villarica) and didn’t respond.
But, five minutes after we left the summit the storm unleashed. The greatest problem I had was that my sunglasses nor goggles worked, and instinctively I went down the small ravine, in “the cave”, and I realized that the Italians had left their backpacks and had summited only with what they were wearing (a very bad idea). We took the Windy Pass and we got lost. We were barely able to keep ourselves together, the visibility at that moment was about a half meter beyond our feet. Fortunately my GPS had marked the Independencia Refuge and still was difficult to find, and seriously endangered my life and that of my clients (who always are with a whistle that isn’t metal,) arriving destroyed to the Berlin Refuge. That night I couldn’t sleep, attentive to the arrival of the Italian group and because of the cold (within Berlin the thermometer registered -20 Celsius!)
In the morning I heard the helicopter which convinced me that something had happened. I went down with my clients without them knowing a thing.
Below, in the “Nido de Condores” we ran into a porter from Grajales and he said that a porteo was going up and that some Italians were lost, and at that point there was no doubt.
That night in the the Plaza de Mulas they speculated about many things, including that they were all dead. In the morning, on Wednesday, only then…!!!ONLY THEN!!!, did they begin to get together and send up the rescue teams (the strongest guides and porters)…and they had already been up there for two nights at -20 Celsius. Some left from Plaza de Mulas and other in the helicopter that left them in Berlin and from there an advance group went up, and a group of support/relief. It is difficult to go up to the summit and then descend down the possible mistaken routes, there were various rescuers (rescue team members) with altitude sickness and the weather was really bad, as can be seen in the video.
-the work of the rescuers is pretty hard, what you can see in the video is very limited, and one would need to know how long it takes for the rescuers to get to a safe place without the rescued person, “if the rescue puts in risk the rescuers, unfortunately that is where the rescue stops.”
-in these types of rescues you don’t need people with technical capacity, but human mules who are capable of supporting and carrying great weight(which was not noted in the video.)
-after the second night only then did they begin to “get together” and send up the rescue group, even though the Helicopter had already seen them after the first night. What do you think of that?
-very deficient the rescue gear and material, 500 dollars to enter the park and the cots are for decoration.
-regarding the insulting words of the rescuers I personally don’t give it much importance, I take it as a desperate measure, even though I would desperately have been trying to drag him in some way, as some of the other forum members have noted.
-the fallen guide was a UIAGM guide, I am only an ENAM guide, so we return to the debate over the value of a piece of paper, “where the potatoes get hot.”
-the Guide that went down with the Italian (I believe his name was Rolo) is a guide born and raised in Aconcagua, and surely would not have made the mistake in the path, and that he went down only to comply with the roles of the guides and assistant, and if there was more humility, the guide with more experience would have been the leader.
-…well you can continue extracting conclusions, and I leave you with the doubt.
and so to finalize my extensive testimony I thank you for the patience for reading this and I invite you to see a video that is a bit more optimistic, maybe the other side of the coin.
According to one letter by a local guide, the current state of the Aconcagua rescue system is poor, as guides supply there own rescue gear and rescue teams don’t have a satellite phone nor a Mariner rescue sled. Rescuers work with a large plastic container split in half as their rescue sled for injured or dead.
Here is an interview with the father of the dead guide: